RINDOSH.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

11/12/2012 2:57 PM

CONTINUING RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS: QUESTIONING
BURDENS ON PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT IN NEW JERSEY
Jason Rindosh
I.

*

INTRODUCTION

It is amazing how the English language contains some words
so inherently ambiguous that they can only be properly defined by
contextual examples. “Liberty,” a treasured term used in both the
1
Federal Constitution and state constitutions in the United States, is
perhaps one term that can only be superficially understood until
placed in context. The meaning of such an open term, capable of
expansive or narrow interpretation, would have only semantic value if
it were not for the legal protections that the Federal Constitution and
2
other state constitutions afford against deprivations of liberty. The
interpretive meaning ascribed to the term liberty is thus more than
for sake of clarification or philosophical exercise, it is the
constitutional rule.
This Comment addresses a narrow issue that implicates both
federal and state constitutional concerns involving the scope of the
word liberty. It specifically proffers that the term liberty ought to
imbue every publicly employed individual with a constitutionally
protected fundamental right to choose where to make his abode,
spend his free time, and raise his family, without the threat of being
discharged or foreclosed of opportunities from public employ. The
only necessary exception to this rule should render unprotected
those private decisions that impede the employee from fulfilling the
duties of his or her position. The heart of the issue can be framed
generally as “whether the government may compel an individual to

*
J.D. Candidate, May 2012, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2005,
Rowan University. Thank you Professor Robert Martin for your helpful assistance
and guidance and my father and mother for all they have ever done.
1
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. pmbl. (The purpose of the Constitution was partly “to
form a more perfect Union . . . and secure the Blessings of Liberty.”); N.J. CONST. art.
I, § 1 (All people have an inalienable right “of enjoying and defending life and
liberty.”); N.C. CONST. art. I, § 1 (It is “self-evident that all persons . . . are
endowed . . . with certain inalienable rights . . . among these . . . liberty.”).
2
See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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live within its boundaries as a condition of continued employment.”
For clarity, it is important to distinguish among the various types
of residency requirements at the outset. Continuing residency
requirements must first be distinguished from durational residency
requirements both in terms of the definition and the constitutional
4
analysis that the majority of courts apply. Durational residency
requirements apportion benefits or impose hardships differently
among residents that have lived in a jurisdiction for some defined
period of time and those that have recently moved within the
5
jurisdictional scope of the applicable law. In Shapiro v. Thompson, the
U.S. Supreme Court determined that a durational residency
requirement imposing a one-year waiting period prior to the receipt
of welfare benefits impinged on “the fundamental right of interstate
movement” and applied an intermediate level of constitutional
6
scrutiny requiring that the law further a compelling state interest.
Contrary to the durational variety, continuing residency
requirements, of the variety pertaining to employment, require
residency within an identifiable geographically defined area, whether
a city, county, or state, as a condition precedent to the receipt and
7
continuation of employment. These requirements apply only to
those individuals who are publicly employed, and approximately
twenty-four percent of cities within the United States currently force a
public employee to live within city limits as part of a continuing
8
residency requirement. Residency requirements can and have been
enacted through various legislative means, including state statute,
9
10
municipal ordinance, or municipal charter.
3

See Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 319 A.2d 483, 501 (N.J. 1974) (Pashman,
J., dissenting).
4
See Ector v. City of Torrance, 514 P.2d 433, 437 (Cal. 1973) (noting that
continuing residency requirements utilize residency as a condition precedent to the
receipt of a benefit whereas durational requirements have this requirement in
addition to a waiting period necessary to the receipt of the benefit).
5
See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969) (providing a
description of the functioning of durational residency requirements in the form of a
waiting-period for the receipt of welfare benefits for newly arrived residents).
6
Id. at 638.
7
See, e.g., Kennedy v. City of Newark, 148 A.2d 473, 475 (N.J. 1959) (reviewing
an ordinance for the city of Newark that required “all of its officers and employees to
reside in the city as a condition for continued employment”). Sometimes these
requirements will allow a newly hired employee a graced period during which he or
she is required to comply with the requirement. See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
8
See Brian Duncan, Using Municipal Residency Requirements to Disguise Public Policy,
33 PUB. FIN. REV. 84, 84 (2005).
9
See, e.g., CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUN. CODE ch. 308, §§ 83(a)–(b) (2010) (requiring
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Regardless of the precise legislative means utilized to enact the
requirement, continuing residency requirements can be further
bifurcated into two variations. The first variation, the targeted
residency requirement, imputes the requirement on a class of
employees for a specific purpose stemming from the unique duties
11
and obligations required by the employment position. For example,
police officers, as a class, may be required to live in a city in light of a
public policy determination that they are implicitly obligated to
12
remain actively protective of the community during off-duty hours.
A “comprehensive residency law,” by contrast, “requires all municipal
13
employees hired after the law is enacted to live in the city.”
Comprehensive and targeted residency laws can be more expansive
than a limitation of residency to a city, however, such as requiring
residency in a state or county for all employees as a condition of
14
employment. The geographic area delineated by the requirement
naturally corresponds to one aspect relevant to determining the
15
scope of the burden. In terms of constitutional treatment, the U.S.
Supreme Court has applied a rational basis level of scrutiny in
upholding targeted residency requirements for police officers against
16
challenges levied under the Equal Protection Clause.
The U.S.
Supreme Court has further rejected the argument that a residency

any employee of the city to reside in the state of Ohio; requiring firefighters and
police to live within the city or an adjacent county to fulfill duties in the event of an
emergency; and further requiring “senior executive officers” to reside within the city
because necessary to fulfill obligations owed to the city).
10
See, e.g., CLEVELAND, OHIO, CITY CHARTER ch. 11, § 74(a) (1982) (providing
that all employees of the city must live within its geographic boundaries).
11
Duncan, supra note 8, at 87.
12
See Detroit Police Officers Ass’n v. City of Detroit, 190 N.W.2d 97, 98 (Mich.
1971), appeal dismissed, 405 U.S. 950 (1972) (noting the fact that Detroit police
officers were required to carry weapons at all times, including off duty hours, which
evidenced a specific need for police officers to be present and active in the
community during their off-duty hours). This point will be further explicated as part
of an argument that the obligations and duties of being a police officer are easily
differentiated from other classes of public employees. See infra Part III.B.4.
13
Duncan, supra note 8, at 87.
14
See CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUN. CODE ch. 308, § 83(a) (requiring all employees of
the city to reside in the state of Ohio).
15
Aside from the geographic area, the scope of applicable persons is determined
by what classes of employees are covered. Naturally, comprehensive residence
requirements are the most onerous in this respect as they affect every class of
employee.
16
See Detroit Police Officers Ass’n, 405 U.S. 950 (implying that rational basis review
was appropriate as utilized by the Michigan Supreme Court for residency
requirements of police officers).
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requirement targeting firefighters infringes upon a fundamental
17
right to travel protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
Both cases that the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed pertained to
targeted, rather than comprehensive, residency requirements. These
targeted residency requirements can be further narrowed to classes of
employees obligated to perform public safety functions.
The propriety of residency requirements has also been
18
considered at the state level. After the financial meltdown of 2008,
the New Jersey legislature proposed various comprehensive residency
requirements effectively requiring any public employee working in
19
New Jersey to live in the state as a condition of employment. The
original proposal sought to amend the existing statute, N.J.S.A. §
20
52:14-7, to require that any person employed or holding a position
in the state of New Jersey make his or her principal residency in the
21
state. Principal residency is defined in the bill as the place “where
the person spends the majority of his or her nonworking time,
and . . . which is most clearly the center of his or her domestic life,
and . . . which is designated as his or her legal address and legal
22
residence for voting.” The bill, as first introduced, also provided
that anyone obtaining employment or a position within the state
would be temporarily exempt from the requirement for one year or
for a period of four months from the point of assuming an office or
23
position. Persons already employed by the state in violation of the
requirement would also have a grace period of two years and six

17

McCarthy v. Phila. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 424 U.S. 645, 646–47 (1976) (per
curiam) (holding that a similar requirement for a firefighter of the city of
Philadelphia does not violate the interstate right to travel under Shapiro’s precedent).
18
See, e.g., Assemb., A2515, 213th Leg., (N.J. 2008).
19
Id. Introduced on March 8th, this bill was comprehensive and contained
exemptions for persons with specialized skill and a period of deferral for financial
hardship. Id. This bill was later combined with A3808 and adopted in a substantially
less comprehensive form on January 4th, 2010. See Assemb., A2515/A3808, 213th
Leg. (N.J. 2010).
20
S. S1730, 214th Leg. (N.J. 2010).
21
Id. The scope of the original bill covered virtually every employee as it applied
to any person holding an office or position in any branch of the State government,
or “with an authority, board, body, agency, commission . . . or instrumentality of the
State including any State college, university or other educational institution, or . . .
with a county, municipality, or other political subdivision of the State or an authority,
board, body, agency, district, commission, or instrumentality of the county,
municipality, or subdivision.” Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
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months to comply with the requirement under the original bill.
Finally, the bill provided that any person violating the requirement
for a 365-day period would be subject to judicial ouster if “any officer
25
or citizen of the state” brings an action within a year of the violation.
On May 13, 2010, the New Jersey Senate approved the “New
26
Jersey First Act” proposal that Senators Norcross and O’Toole first
27
initiated. The Senate Committee substitute that was approved on
May 13, 2010 included some substantial changes to the structure of
28
the original bill. Important changes included an exemption for all
persons currently holding public employment positions so long as
they did not “voluntarily” change their “employment, office, or
29
position.”
Further, the bill was altered to include a separate
exemption for “any person . . . employed on a temporary or persemester basis as a visiting professor, teacher, lecturer, or researcher
by any State college, university, other educational institution” and for
persons with job duties that require them to spend the majority of
30
their working time outside of the state. The final variations adopted
in the Senate Committee substitute also sought to create a threemember panel “composed of a person appointed by the Governor, a
person appointed by the Speaker of the General Assembly, and a
person appointed by the President of the Senate” to consider
31
applications for residency exemptions. Though later abandoned,
the Senate’s initial contemplations regarding the types of exemptions
granted seemed to portend that they would be limited to individuals
working at universities who “hold a position requiring special
24

Id.
Id.
26
S. S1730, 214th Leg., S. Comm. Substitute (N.J. 2010).
27
S. S1730, 214th Leg., (N.J. 2010). Senators Norcross and O’Toole initially
made the proposal on March 11, 2009.
28
S. S1730, 214th Leg., S. Comm. Substitute (N.J. 2010). An identical bill was
introduced to the New Jersey Assembly on March 8, 2010. See Assemb., A2478, 214th
Leg. (N.J. 2010).
29
S. S1730, 214th Leg., S. Comm. Substitute (N.J. 2010). An example of an
involuntary change in position would be forced reassignment. Id. Most residency
requirements, assuming they have not been on the books for some extended period
of time, offer an amnesty for individuals living outside the required area holding
employment positions prior to enactment. See Lorenz v. Logue, 611 F.2d 421, 423
(2d Cir. 1979) (acknowledging Judge Burns’s observation that a clause exempting
employees hired prior to the residency requirement while imposing the requirement
on newly hired employees was “the least disruptive and most humane method” to
implement a residency requirement).
30
S. S1730, 214th Leg., S. Comm. Substitute (N.J. 2010).
31
Id.
25
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expertise or extraordinary qualifications in a scientific or technical
32
area.” The Senate Committee substitute required that the threemember committee give applications from persons with such
expertise or extraordinary qualifications “particular attention” and
consider how denying the individual an exemption would be
injurious to New Jersey’s ability to “compete successfully” with
33
scientific and technical colleges and schools of other states.
After the New Jersey State Assembly approved the bill, Governor
Chris Christie commended “the sponsors for their efforts to increase
employment opportunities for New Jersey residents” in his
34
conditional veto. The conditional veto was limited to a concern that
the three-member panel reviewing hardship applications needed to
be revamped to establish an “appropriate review process” capable of
35
dealing with the expected volume of applications. The New Jersey
Senate was in its second reading and, likely considering the concerns
of Governor Christie’s conditional veto, made some final changes to
36
the bill. The New Jersey First Act was approved on March 17, 2011,
37
and became effective starting September 1, 2011.
The enacted New Jersey First Act retained much of the substance
38
of the Senate Committee substitute. The Act maintained the same
definition of “principal residence” and the comprehensive
application to any person “holding office, employment, or position”
39
in the State of New Jersey. The exemption for certain employees at
institutions of higher education, as well as the exemption for persons
spending the majority of their working hours outside of the State,
40
were also incorporated in the final bill. Perhaps to facilitate an
efficient review of the higher education exemption, the bill requires
that each university or institution provide a report enumerating the
full- and part-time positions exempt and the reasons for the claimed

32

Id.
Id. Some classes of employees and positions, specifically the head of a
principle department of the executive branch and any judge of the State Supreme
Court, Superior Court, or any other lower court created by the laws of the state, are
categorically barred from applying for the exemption. Id.
34
S. S1730, 214th Conditional Veto (N.J. 2011).
35
Id.
36
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14-7 (West 2010)
37
Id.
38
Compare S. S1730, 214th Leg., S. Comm. Substitute (N.J. 2010), with N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 52:14-7 (West 2010).
39
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14-7 (West 2010).
40
Id.
33
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41

exemption. By reviewing the exemptions by position instead of on
an individual basis, the reviewing panel should be able to more
efficiently review applications as was of concern for Governor
Christie.
The most monumental decisions made with respect to the New
Jersey First Act were twofold. First, the final bill included a
42
grandfather clause.
Under the grandfather clause, any person
holding office, employment, or a position with the state and having a
principal residence outside the state will not be affected by the
residency requirement so long as that individual is “without a break
43
in public service of greater than seven days.”
Second, the New
Jersey First Act enlarged the committee to review applications from
three members to five and empowered it to grant exemptions “on the
44
basis of critical need or hardship.” Perhaps seeking to respond to
Governor Christie’s plea for greater committee efficiency, any
application the five-member committee fails to act upon within thirty
45
days is automatically subject to the residency requirement.
Structurally, the committee is comprised of three appointees from
the Governor, one from the Speaker of the General Assembly, and a
46
final member appointed by the President of the Senate.
Each
47
appointment lasts a term not to exceed five years.
As this fivemember committee has the power to designate who can avoid the
requirement as a critical hardship, the committee’s interpretation
and construal of “critical hardship” will determine the breadth of the
exemption.
Since New Jersey has passed its first comprehensive statewide
48
residency requirement affecting all current and future public
employees of the state, questions of whether the law is constitutional,
and perhaps more important, prudent, are implicated. Although this

41

Id. The initial report was to be filed within sixty days of the effective date of
September 1, 2011. Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14-7 (West 2010).
45
Id. Indubitably, the standard could have been to accept rather than reject any
application the committee failed to act upon. It is relatively unknown what volume
of hardship exemptions will be requested at this time.
46
§ 52:14-7.
47
Id.
48
Even with the incorporation of the grandfather requirement, the New Jersey
First Act still burdens any employee residing outside the State as he or she could face
termination after a break in public service lasting longer than one week.
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Comment focuses primarily on the constitutional implications of
imposing a comprehensive state residency requirement on all
employees of New Jersey, the constitutional and policy arguments set
forth would similarly apply to residency requirements limited to a
49
county or municipality.
Part II of this Comment traces the history and use of residency
requirements, with a particularized focus on the jurisprudence of the
U.S. Supreme Court and the New Jersey Supreme Court with regard
to continuing residency requirements for public employees. Part III
analyzes potential constitutional arguments, under both the New
Jersey and Federal Constitutions, and other policy-based arguments
that could potentially invalidate a comprehensive statewide residency
requirement like the New Jersey First Act under an Equal Protection,
Privileges and Immunities, or Dormant Commerce Clause
constitutional challenge. Part IV provides a summary of the New
Jersey First Act and the constitutional and policy-based concerns of
imposing a comprehensive residency requirement on all public
employees. As a general conclusion, this Comment surmises that the
passing of a comprehensive statewide residency requirement for New
Jersey, albeit perhaps imprudent, will likely withstand constitutional
challenges whether brought under the New Jersey or Federal
Constitution.
II. THE HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE OF CONTINUING RESIDENCY
REQUIREMENTS
A. The Legislative and Policy Component to Continuing Residency
Requirements
Both durational and continuing residency requirements have a
long history stretching back to the English feudal system that
subsequently became American norms incorporated and learned
50
through the British colonies. In 1601, Parliament passed An Act for

49

I make this statement willfully admitting the argument cannot be as neatly
levied against city, county, or municipal residency requirements depending on the
argument considered. For example, a claim under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause is stronger with respect to a statewide comprehensive residency requirement,
such as the New Jersey First Act, if one perceives the scope of the clause as not
applying to intrastate travel. See generally Andrew C. Porter, Comment, Toward a
Constitutional Analysis of the Right to Intrastate Travel, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 820, 836–37
(1992) (speculating that a right to intrastate travel could call into question the
constitutionality of a multitude of local laws, including residency requirements).
50
CHARLES S. RHYNE, WILLIAM S. RHYNE & STEPHAN P. ELMENDORF, THE
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the Relief of the Poor as part of the Elizabethan Poor Laws, which
51
In 1662,
created parishes to coordinate aid to the local poor.
Parliament passed An Act for the Better Relief of the Poor of this
Kingdom, giving local justices the ability to return newly arrived poor
to their place of origin within forty days of arrival if the individual was
52
viewed as becoming a burden upon the town.
The 1662 Act
instituted a durational residency requirement that was inherently
protectionist of the local tax base by allowing the return of a poor,
53
sick, or otherwise incapable individual to his or her place of origin.
This effectively forced each community to bear the tax burden of its
54
own poor. Since the birthplace of illegitimate children served as
their places of return if they happened to become poor and tax
burdens on the community, local parish leaders were incentivized to
send an unwed pregnant woman to another parish immediately prior
55
to giving birth or to bribe a man from another parish to marry her.
Though originating in England, continuing residency
requirements developed their own history in the United States. By
the late 1800s, these requirements had become widely disseminated
as a means of creating a restricted class of public employment
positions in the police force or city hall that could be farmed out to
those who paid patronage to the alderman victor in earlier periods of
56
57
political uncertainty. In return, the alderman received a reliable
vote in future elections because the individual’s employment position
58
depended directly on the alderman’s future success. Additionally,
the alderman could rely on the loyalty of these individuals for law
enforcement investigations, obtaining bribes, or collecting protection
money, with the public employees receiving their own personal gains
59
in the form of “kickbacks” and job security.
In an attempt to obviate the past mechanisms of political
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS AND
EMPLOYEES 45 (1977).
51
An Act for the Relief of the Poor, 1601, 43 Eliz. 1, c. 2 (Eng.).
52
An Act for the Better Relief of the Poor of this Kingdom, 1662, 14 Car. 2, c. 12
§ 1, 2 (Eng.).
53
See Peter Higginbotham, The Poor Laws, THE WORKHOUSE (2012),
http://www.workhouses.org.uk/poorlaws.
54
See id.
55
Id.
56
WILLIAM ANDERSON, AMERICAN CITY GOVERNMENT (1925).
57
An “alderman,” also known as an “alderperson,” is “a member of a city council
or other local governing body.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
58
ANDERSON, supra note 56.
59
Id.
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corruption, proposals to institute a merit-based system of pay came to
60
be viewed as a potential solution to onerous residency requirements.
Despite evidence of early advocacy against continuing residency
requirements, cities around the country, with the exception of
Berkeley and Washington, retained their residency requirements for
61
police officers. When World War II created a shortage of eligible
police officers in Dallas, however, the city was forced to abandon its
targeted residency requirement to recruit a sufficient number of
62
officers.
After Portland removed its comprehensive residency
requirement in the early 1960s by way of charter amendment, New
York and Boston followed suit upon subsequently removing their
63
residency requirements.
Only a few big cities retained their
64
residency requirements by the late 1960s. In other cities and parts
of the country, residency requirements were kept on the book but
65
remained widely unenforced.
As residency requirements were being retracted or not enforced,
critics pressed on with arguments that the requirements were needed
to alleviate the cities’ financial distress, to maintain racial balance
within the police force, and to improve the quality of law
66
enforcement.
Their campaign was unsuccessful in most areas
during the early 1970s, with the exception of Detroit and Los
67
Angeles. When the horrendous fiscal situation of the early 1970s
surfaced, however, cities reevaluated and began to, again, enforce
68
their residency requirements. Mayor Beame of New York pleaded
for a city-wide comprehensive residency requirement, believing that
the fiscal plight and rampant unemployment in the city created an
entitlement right to municipal jobs for people living within city
69
limits.
60

See Wisc. Policy Research Inst., The Milwaukee Teacher Residency Requirement: Why
It’s Bad for Schools, and Why It Won’t Go Away, 19 WIS. POL’Y RES. INST. REP. 5, 5 (June
2006) [hereinafter MPS Report].
61
See ROBERT S. FOGELSON, BIG-CITY POLICE 82 (1977); COMM. ON THE D.C.,
REMOVAL OF RESTRICTION ON RESIDENCE OF MEMBERS OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT, H.R.
DOC. NO. 855, at 1–2 (1935).
62
See FOGELSON, supra note 61, at 182.
63
Id.
64
Brian R. Johnson, Greg L. Warchol & Vic W. Bumphus, Police Residential
Requirements: An Exploratory Analysis, 26 J. COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS 43, 45 (1997).
65
See FOGELSON, supra note 61, at 182.
66
Id. at 306.
67
Id. at 307.
68
Id.
69
RESIDENCY PLAN GAIN IN COUNCIL: Would Limit Municipal Jobs to Workers
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The reversion to residency requirements protectionist of local
public employment has been attributed to the fiscal crisis many cities
70
experienced during the early 1970s. Albeit with some exceptions,
courts generally rejected early challenges to the constitutionality of
71
residency requirements. The ability to use these requirements to
insulate local public employment positions and create local jobs in
hard economic times likely provided guidance to legislatures
elsewhere and facilitated the subsequent widespread proliferation of
these requirements.
B. Judicial Discourse Regarding Continuing Residency Requirements
1.

The Kennedy Case and the Initial Challenge to
Continuing Residency Requirements in New Jersey
under the Equal Protection Clause

Aside from unsuccessful political attempts to extinguish
residency requirements, New Jersey jurisprudence has remained
indubitably steadfast in deferring to legislative decisions, regardless of
whether the plaintiff challenged a targeted or comprehensive
residency requirement. In Kennedy v. City of Newark, the New Jersey
Supreme Court first confronted arguments regarding the
constitutionality of a comprehensive residency requirement that had
72
been enacted in Newark in 1932. The Newark ordinance required
73
all public officers and employees to reside within the city’s limits.
After the disclosure information obtained from “loyalty oaths”
revealed that 585 employees were non-residents in violation of the
comprehensive requirement and therefore subject to termination,
the disgruntled employees argued that the New Jersey State
74
Constitution insulated the employees from loss of continued

Living in City, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1975, at 35.
70
Peter K. Esinger, Municipal Residency Requirements and the Local Economy, 64
SOC. SCI. Q. 85, 85–95 (1983).
71
Compare Trainor v. City of Newark, 368 A.2d 381, 385 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1976) (holding that Newark’s comprehensive residency requirement was not
unconstitutional by virtue of statutory exemptions for police and firefighters), with
Hanson v. Unified Sch. Dist., 364 F. Supp. 330, 334 (D. Kan. 1974) (holding a
residency requirement for teachers unconstitutional under the Equal Protection
Clause).
72
148 A.2d 473, 475 (N.J. 1959).
73
Id.
74
See N.J. CONST., art. I, para. 1 (“All persons are by nature free and
independent, and have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are
those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and
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75

employment.
Chief Justice Weintraub framed the issue not as
“whether a man is free to live where he will” but whether “he may live
where he wishes and at the same time insist upon employment by
76
government.” Although the requirement had never been enforced
against a single resident despite being on the books for thirty-seven
years prior to Kennedy, the New Jersey Supreme Court held for the
city by reasoning that the “missing link” of “official knowledge” of the
violations warranted enforcement against the plaintiff public
77
employees.
The Kennedy decision was important because it established an
early precedent in New Jersey that an equal protection argument
under the State Constitution could not be utilized as a means of
obviating a comprehensive residency requirement. Additionally, the
Court implicitly recognized that the rationale behind the ordinance
could not have been merely to require emergency personnel to
reside in the city in order to be responsive to emergency situations, as
78
its application covered other public employees. Instead, the Court
accorded deference to the decision that a comprehensive residency
79
requirement could be legitimized under the “public coffer theory”
protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.”).
75
Kennedy, 148 A.2d at 475.
76
Id. at 476.
77
Id. This suggests that there would be some argument that would exculpate a
plaintiff from the requirement upon a showing of both willful misfeasance and
official knowledge of the act. Justice Pashman, in a later dissent, reasoned that the
presence of official knowledge of violations of some twenty-one employees
constituted arbitrary discrimination that violated the Equal Protection Clause and
rendered the ordinance imputing the residency requirement unenforceable. See
Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 319 A.2d 473, 503–04 (N.J. 1974) (Pashman, J.,
dissenting).
78
The classes of employees that come to mind when considering this targeted
residency requirement would be EMT personnel, firefighters, police officers, and
other public employment positions necessitating a response during emergency
situations.
79
See People v. Crane, 108 N.E. 427, 429 (N.Y. 1915), affirmed, 239 U.S. 195
(1915) (providing for a “principle of exclusion” allowing “the restriction of the
resources of the state to the advancement and profit of the members of the state”).
But see Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971) (rejecting the public interest
doctrine of conditioning the receipt of a State benefit on the receipt of tax
contributions); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 632 (1969) (dismissing the
rationale that a State could apportion a benefit between citizens classified based on
past tax contributions). It is worth noting that both of these decisions came after
Kennedy, where the “public coffer” reasoning was accepted. See Kennedy, 148 A.2d at
476 (The court endorsed Newark’s ordinance on “common acceptance of the
proposition that the Legislature may well find the public interest is advanced by
residence within the political unit which provides the pay.”).
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and upon legislative balancing that residency would induce an
80
employee to perform better. Moreover, the Court implied that the
issue was a political question best resolved by the political process and
surmised that the plaintiffs should bring their grievances “to the local
81
legislative body” or directly to the state legislature.
Subsequent to the Kennedy decision, in Detroit Police Officers Ass’n
v. City of Detroit, the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed, for lack of a
substantial federal question, a challenge to targeted residency
82
requirements for police officers in the city of Detroit. The Michigan
Supreme Court previously held that there was a rational basis for
requiring police officers to reside in the city as a condition of
employment because their job duties were naturally distinguishable
83
“from all other city employees.”
The Court used the specific
example of the requirement incumbent upon all police officers to
carry their weapons during off-duty hours as evidencing that the
police were “a semi-military organization subject at all times to
immediate mobilization, which distinguishe[d] this type of
84
employment from every other in the classified service.”
Justice Brennan’s concurrence argued that deference should be
accorded to the legislative determination and proffered some insight
85
into the ends sought through the requirement. He posited that the
legislature sought to coordinate an improved relationship between
86
the African American residents and the police force of Detroit. The
residency requirement had been enacted when Detroit’s population
was over forty percent African American and the surrounding
87
suburbs had a less than ten percent African American population.
Statistics indicate that only a dismal five percent of Detroit’s police
force was African American in 1967, thereby providing support for
Justice Brennan’s allusions to a possible legislative desire to maintain
a racial balance between Detroit, its suburban population, and its
88
police force. Being that a dismissal for want of a substantial federal
question was a decision on the merits, Detroit Police Officers Ass’n
80

Kennedy, 148 A.2d at 476.
Id.
82
Detroit Police Officers Ass’n v. City of Detroit, 190 N.W.2d 97, 97 (Mich.
1971), appeal dismissed, 405 U.S. 950 (1972).
83
Id. at 97–98.
84
Id. at 98.
85
Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
See FOGELSON, supra note 61, at 248.
81
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signaled that the protection of the powerful stare decisis doctrine
could now be invoked to combat challenges to continuing residency
requirements for police officers levied under the Equal Protection
89
Clause.
2.

More Rational Reasons for Residency Requirements
and Challenges Claiming a Fundamental “Right to
Travel”

A fuller exposition of the potential rational reasons for
enforcing a continuing residency requirement came from the
California case Ector v. City of Torrance, where the plaintiff, a city
90
librarian, challenged a residency requirement. The librarian urged
the court to apply heightened scrutiny for violations of her “right to
91
travel” announced as fundamental in Shapiro. Foreshadowing the
U.S. Supreme Court’s later decision in McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil
92
Service Commission, the California Supreme Court rejected the
plaintiff’s argument to apply the Shapiro fundamental right analysis by
relegating it to a narrower application limited to durational residency
93
requirements only. The California Supreme Court also accepted
the issue as Justice Weintraub had professed it in Kennedy and applied
94
a rational basis test to the equal protection challenge.
While
accepting the reasoning of Detroit Police Officers Ass’n regarding the
natural and distinguishing characteristics of police officers and the
need for emergency personnel, the California Supreme Court
enumerated a list submitted by amici curiae indicating multiple
rational ends sought to be obtained through continuing residency
95
requirements. The court found that any of the potential reasons

89

See Ahern v. Murphy, 457 F.2d 363, 364 (7th Cir. 1972).
514 P.2d 433, 434 (Cal. 1973).
91
Id.; see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630–31 (1969) (acknowledging
that the right to travel is ordinary and fundamental to the Federal Union).
92
424 U.S. 645 (1967).
93
Ector, 514 P.2d at 436–37.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 436. Specifically the court provided that:
the promotion of ethnic balance in the community; reduction in high
unemployment rates of inner-city minority groups; improvement of
relations between such groups and city employees; enhancement of the
quality of employee performance by greater personal knowledge of the
city’s conditions and by a feeling of greater personal stake in the city’s
progress; diminution of absenteeism and tardiness among municipal
personnel; ready availability of trained manpower in emergency
situations; and the general economic benefits flowing from local
90
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provided would serve as a rational basis for the residency
requirement, and thus upheld imposing its strictures on the public
96
librarian.
The New Jersey Supreme Court first confronted a challenge to a
continuing residency requirement predicated on a fundamental
“right to travel” argument in Abrahams v. Civil Service Commission,
where the same Newark residency requirement that had been
attacked in Kennedy under the New Jersey State Constitution’s equal
protection grounds was once again challenged in light of the U.S.
97
Supreme Court’s decision in Shapiro.
The Abrahams case was
decided at a time when residency requirements had become
attractive policy tools for legislatures to combat the “white flight” of
public employees who began moving to the suburbs in mass exodus
98
from large cities during the 1960s.
Newark’s experience was
particularly emblematic; the city lost 70,000 white residents between
99
the years of 1960 and 1967.
This figure included the growing
number of public employees that retained two addresses, one in the
city and one in the suburbs, as a means of deceptively complying
100
while flouting the legislative intent of the residency requirement.
New Jersey later closed this loophole in its decision in Mercadante v.
City of Paterson, where the Court held that police and firefighters
maintaining dual addresses, one inside the city and one outside,
101
failed to comply with the statutory residency requirement.
In Abrahams, a law department secretary had provided a Newark
address when applying for her position in 1966 and moved into
102
Newark in 1967. In 1970, however, she left Newark to live in nearby
Union and was terminated from her position for violating the
103
The secretary argued that the ordinance
residency requirement.
violated her constitutional right to travel under the precedent of

expenditure of employees’ salaries were all rational ends sought to be
obtained through the use of residency requirements.
Id.
96

Id.
Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 319 A.2d 483, 484 (N.J. 1974). For a
discussion of the Kennedy decision, see text accompanying notes 5, 7, 59–61.
98
See Johnson, Warchol & Bumphus, supra note 64, at 45.
99
See id.
100
See id.
101
266 A.2d 611, 613–14 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1970), affirmed, 275 A.2d 440
(1971).
102
Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 319 A.2d 483, 484 (N.J. 1974).
103
Id.
97
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Shapiro and further that the ordinance was enforced discriminatorily
104
against her. The Court quickly dismissed the precedential value of
Shapiro as applied to the continuing residency requirement at issue,
noting the distinction between durational and continuing residency
105
requirements.
Furthermore, the Court approvingly cited the
rational basis factors first enunciated by the California Supreme
Court in Ector in support of enforcing continuing residency
106
requirements. The specific example of lowering unemployment in
Newark to be achieved via the residency requirement was accepted as
107
a legitimate policy end for the requirement.
With regard to the argument of selective enforcement, the
Court’s majority took the position that the factual record had
108
unearthed no evidence of a policy of non-enforcement.
Interestingly, the Court qualified this with a reminder that there
would “be no excuse for continued non-enforcement of the
ordinance in the future if in fact that ha[d] been the case in the
109
past.” In actuality, the factual record had offered more than scant
110
evidence of selective enforcement.
Aside from the law
department’s nine attorneys, who were statutorily exempt from the
requirement, a statistical sample taken of 142 other department
111
employees had revealed that twenty-one were non-residents.
Justice Clifford concurred in the judgment of Abrahams though
he lamented, “[i]t is difficult to escape the impression that we are
112
reviewing this case with blinders on.” Justice Clifford was referring
to the fact that the secretary had failed to raise questions in the trial
court regarding the propriety of certain statutory exemptions
afforded to other classes of employees that would have strengthened
the argument regarding the unconstitutionality, and hence overall

104

Id. at 484–85 (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)). The
secretary also argued that the “special circumstances” exception provided for in the
ordinance was void for vagueness, but this issue is not considered further. Id.
105
Id. at 486.
106
Id. at 489.
107
Id.
108
Abrahams, 319 A.2d at 490–91.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 485.
111
Id. The dissenting Justice Pashman argued forcefully that this significant
number of non-complying residents combined with official knowledge constituted
arbitrary discrimination that should render the requirement unenforceable under
the precedent of Kennedy. See id. at 503 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
112
Id. at 491 (Clifford, J., concurring).
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enforceability, of the residency requirement.
Specifically, Justice
Clifford was referencing statutory exemptions that the state
legislature had passed that prohibited municipalities from using
residency as a condition for “original appointment, continued
114
employment, promotion, or for any other purpose . . .” for police
115
Thus, Justice Clifford may have implicitly been
and firefighters.
alluding to the need for the requirement to be uniformly applied to
116
all classes of employees.
The dissenting Justice Pashman viewed the residency
requirement unconstitutional as both “an infringement upon the
right to travel unsupported by a sufficiently compelling interest to
justify the restriction” and as a violation of the Equal Protection
117
Clause. With regard to the issue of selective enforcement that the
plaintiff raised, Justice Pashman acknowledged that the majority’s
holding effectively would require a stenographer to reside inside of
the city, while a police officer would be free to live where he or she
118
may choose.
Pashman described Chief Justice Weintraub’s earlier
refusal to find a compelling state interest or fundamental right
protected by the New Jersey Constitution as being motivated by
Weintraub’s personal disavowal of such concepts as ambiguous and

113

Id.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:14-122.1 (West 2010). In its entirety the statute
provides:
No municipality shall pass any ordinance, resolution, rule, regulation,
order or directive, making residency therein a condition of
employment for the purpose of original appointment, continued
employment, promotion, or for any other purpose for any member of a
police department and force and any such ordinance, resolution, rule,
regulation, order or directive in existence on the effective date of this
act or passed hereafter shall be void and have no force or effect.
Id.
115
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:14-9.1 (West 2010). The statutory language reads the
same as § 40A:14-122.1, with the only exception being a change of the “police” to
“fire.” Id.
116
The theoretical basis of Justice Clifford’s statutory exemptions for certain
classes of employees is arguably relevant to the exemption process incorporated into
the New Jersey First Act, particularly the blanket exemption for persons with
specialized skill or knowledge at institutions of higher education. This exemption is
the result of reasoned opinion that it is necessary to help keep New Jersey’s higher
public education competitive. See § 52:14-7. Contrarily, one can only surmise that an
exemption for police and firefighters from targeted localized residency requirement
is anything other than the result of a successful lobby.
117
See Abrahams, 319 A.2d at 491 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
118
Id. at 498.
114

RINDOSH.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1652

11/12/2012 2:57 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:1635

119

unhelpful to judicial decision-making.
With respect to
“fundamental” constitutional rights and the varying levels of scrutiny
under Equal Protection challenges, Justice Weintraub had previously
elaborated:
[i]f a right is somehow found to be “fundamental,” there
remains the question as to what State interest is
“compelling” and there, too, we find little, if any, light.
Mechanical approaches to the delicate problem of judicial
intervention under either the equal protection or the due
process clauses may only divert a court from the meritorious
issue or delay consideration of it. Ultimately, a court must
weigh the nature of the restraint or the denial against the apparent
public justification, and decide whether the State action is arbitrary.
In that process, if the circumstances sensibly so require, the
court may call upon the State to demonstrate the existence
120
of a sufficient public need for the restraint or the denial.
Justice Pashman rejected Weintraub’s position, reasoning that
although there was no per se fundamental right to public
employment, the state could not condition the privilege of public
121
service on the surrender of a constitutional right.
In this way,
Justice Pashman cast the issue in a light more favorable to the
burdened public employee and surmised the right ought to be
protected under the New Jersey State Constitution as an undue
122
restriction on the right to travel.
A separate but related scrutiny question that had created some
confusion among courts after Shapiro was whether a compelling
government interest standard of review applied to all residency
requirements or just the durational variety. Despite a footnote in
Shapiro making it explicitly clear that the case’s holding was narrow
and not meant to apply to bona fide continuing residency
123
requirements, a federal court in New Jersey applied a compelling
government interest standard and, based on the precedent of Shapiro,
upheld a residency requirement for police and firefighters under this

119

See Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 282 (N.J. 1973).
Id. (emphasis added).
121
See Abrahams, 319 A.2d at 498 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
122
Id. at 495.
123
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 637 n.21 (1969) (“We imply no view of
the validity of waiting-period or residence requirements determining eligibility to
vote, eligibility for tuition-free education, to obtain a license to practice a profession,
to hunt or fish, and so forth.”).
120
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124

heightened standard.
The Krzewinkski v. Kugler, misapplication of
the Shapiro precedent was also adopted in Fraternal Order of Police
Youngstown Lodge No. 28 v. Hunter, where the court used the
compelling state interest standard to strike down a police residency
125
requirement.
In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court directly confronted the
question of Shapiro’s precedential value in McCarthy v. Philadelphia
Civil Service Commission, where a firefighter challenged the
126
termination of his sixteen-year tenure of employment.
The
firefighter had relocated his principal residence from Philadelphia to
New Jersey in violation of a residency requirement and argued that
his termination violated his fundamental right to travel under the
127
Privileges and Immunities Clause. The Court’s per curiam opinion
briskly recounted that a targeted residency requirement for police
officers in Detroit was found “not irrational” by virtue of an earlier
dismissal for want of a substantial federal question in Detroit Police
128
Officers Ass’n.
Further, the Court directly specified that the
constitutional right of interstate travel, though offering the more
stringent compelling governmental interest standard of review, was
not implicated by a continuing residency requirement under the
129
precedent of Shapiro.
3.

Summation of Case Law

The New Jersey Supreme Court first confronted the
constitutionality of comprehensive residency requirements in Kennedy
and the decision became the foundation for subsequent
130
constitutional challenges.
The Kennedy decision served as an early
indication that the New Jersey Supreme Court would defer to
legislative determinations and squash the proliferation of future
claims against comprehensive residency requirements under the
State Constitution. The U.S. Supreme Court’s dismissal of Detroit
Police Officers Ass’n reinforced that the Kennedy decision had

124

Krzewinkski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492, 489 (D.N.J. 1972) (citing Shapiro, 394
U.S. 618).
125
Fraternal Order of Police Youngstown Lodge No. 28 v. Hunter, 49 Ohio App.
2d 185, 198 (Ohio App. Div. 1973), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976).
126
424 U.S. 645, 645 (1976).
127
Id.
128
Id. at 645–46.
129
Id. at 646–47.
130
See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
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appropriately deferred to the legislature’s balancing.
Moreover,
the Ector decision from California supplied an assortment of policy
objectives sought to be obtained through the use of continuing
132
residency requirements.
In Abrahams, the New Jersey Supreme
Court followed the precedent of the Kennedy decision and the
enumeration of policy justifications from Ector. Additionally, the
Abrahams decision signified the New Jersey Supreme Court’s rejection
of the argument that continuing residency requirements violated a
right to travel protected under the compelling governmental interest
133
standard of Shapiro.
Though at least one federal court in New
Jersey had applied a heightened scrutiny to a continuing residency
134
requirement under the precedent of Shapiro, any aspirations for
more scrupulous review under the Privileges and Immunities Clause
became largely foreclosed by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
135
McCarthy.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS
This Comment examines three constitutional arguments that
potential plaintiffs could levy against continuing residency
requirements, with a focus on the jurisprudence of New Jersey and
the recently enacted New Jersey First Act. The first argument posits
that imposing a residency requirement as a condition of public
employment violates a fundamental right to travel preserved under
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Federal Constitution.
This argument additionally considers the possibility that residency
requirements could violate a fundamental right to travel secured by
state constitutional provisions. The second argument propounds that
continuing residency requirements impermissibly discriminate
between classes of persons in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. This section similarly considers the applicability of equal
protection arguments brought under parallel provisions found in
state constitutions. The final constitutional argument considers the
possibility of challenging a statewide residency requirement, such as
the New Jersey First Act, as an impermissible burden on interstate
commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause, under a Dormant
Commerce Clause analysis.
131
132
133
134
135

See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
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A. A Fundamental Right to Travel?
In 1869, the U.S. Supreme Court described the purpose of the
136
Privileges and Immunities Clause expansively, acclaiming that “it
was undoubtedly the object of the clause in question to place the
citizens of each State upon the same footing with citizens of other
States, so far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in those
137
States are concerned.”
Despite the suggestive sweeping
applicability of the Privileges and Immunities Clause in Paul v.
Virginia, its use has been severely restricted and tremendously
circumscribed by the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court—
including in regard to continuing residency requirements.
138
After the McCarthy decision, the controversy over residency
requirements seemed settled to the extent that rational basis review
would apply to equal protection challenges, and that the Privileges
and Immunities Clause would not offer the same compelling
government interest standard applied to the durational residency
139
requirements of Shapiro.
Nevertheless, this did not foreclose all
opportunities for states to offer a more encompassing constitutional
right to travel that would subject continuing residency requirements
to a higher level of constitutional scrutiny than the protections
available under the federal system. The Federal Constitution merely
sets a floor providing a set of the most basic rights assured to each
140
citizen. As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in Pruneyard Shopping
Center v. Robbins, each state may “adopt in its own Constitution
136

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to
all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”).
137
Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180 (1869). The entirety of the passage provides:
It was undoubtedly the object of the clause in question to place the
citizens of each State upon the same footing with citizens of other
States, so far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in those
States are concerned. It relieves them from the disabilities of alienage
in other States; it inhibits discriminating legislation against them by
other States; it gives them the right of free ingress into other States,
and egress from them; it insures to them in other States the same
freedom possessed by the citizens of those States in the acquisition and
enjoyment of property and in the pursuit of happiness . . . . It has been
justly said that no provision in the Constitution has tended so strongly
to constitute the citizens of the United States one people as this.
Id.
138
McCarthy v. Phila. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 424 U.S. 645 (1967); see discussion
supra Part II.B.2.
139
See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 637 (1969); see discussion supra Part
II.B.3.
140
See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980).
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individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the
141
Federal Constitution.”
In Donnelly v. City of Manchester, a case decided before McCarthy,
the New Hampshire Supreme Court considered a schoolteacher’s
challenge to a city ordinance imposing a comprehensive residency
requirement on the city’s employees, effective twelve months from
142
the initial date of employment.
The court posited that the
requirement impinged upon the schoolteacher’s fundamental right
143
protected under both the State and Federal Constitutions.
Although public employment was not inherently a fundamental right,
the “privilege” of being publicly employed could not “be conditioned
144
upon a surrender of a fundamental constitutional right.”
Thus,
instead of deferring to the legislature, the Donnelly court utilized a
fundamental rights standard that considered “the importance of the
public benefit . . . balanced against the seriousness of the restriction
145
of the private right sought to be imposed.”
The court focused on
the broad application of the ordinance, which extended to every
public employee, and concluded that the legislative end of bringing
economic benefits unto the city could not justify such an
146
overinclusive ordinance.
The Donnelly court did not discount the
possibility of a constitutionally sound residency requirement if
properly limited in scope of application:
There is nothing in the record before us nor have any
reasons been advanced which would justify the broad
restrictions of this ordinance. We do not say that there are no
employees whose residence near their place of duty may not be
important enough to justify a restriction upon their place of
residence but if such restrictions are permissible as to some
this does not justify the broad and all inclusive requirement
147
that all employees live within the city limits.
After the McCarthy decision, there was a question about the
continued vitality of Donnelly since it had explicitly relied on the

141

Id.
Donnelly v. City of Manchester, 274 A.2d 789, 789–90 (N.H. 1971).
143
Id. at 791.
144
Id. This mirrors Justice Pashman’s framing of the issue in his dissent in
Abrahams. See Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 319 A.2d 483, 498–99 (N.J. 1974)
(Pashman, J., dissenting).
145
Donnelly, 274 A.2d at 791.
146
See id. at 792.
147
Id. at 791 (emphasis added).
142
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Privileges and Immunities Clause in the Federal Constitution.
Subsequent to the McCarthy decision, the town of Manchester
reenacted a comprehensive residency requirement identical to the
one formerly struck down as unconstitutional by the New Hampshire
Supreme Court, with the only difference being the addition of a
grandfather clause that barred the requirement from affecting
149
current employees.
Despite the overshadowing precedent of
McCarthy rejecting a claim under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, the New Hampshire Supreme Court utilized an elevated
constitutional scrutiny under the New Hampshire State Constitution
and struck down the Manchester comprehensive residency
150
requirement a second time in Angwin v. City of Manchester.
Donnelly is a paradigm of a state’s constitution proffering a right
to travel above and beyond the protections afforded by the Federal
Constitution. The recognition of a fundamental right to live where
one chooses while still possessing the opportunity to hold a position
in public employment under the New Jersey State Constitution, albeit
unlikely, would arguably provide a constitutional form of protection
against legislative decisions seeking to restrict an important freedom.
While it would not foreclose the possibility of residency requirements
for certain classes of employees, heightened judicial scrutiny is
capable of circumscribing legislative residency requirements that
include classes of employees without justification.
A perceived benefit of this type of judicial review may be that it
allows for a more scrupulous analysis of the facts as they exist with
regard to the particular circumstances of the jurisdiction seeking to
enforce a continuing residency requirement. In Seabrook Police Ass’n
151
v. Town of Seabrook,
the Supreme Court of New Hampshire
addressed the constitutionality of a residency requirement providing
that all police officers must reside in the town as a condition of
152
employment.
The court scrutinized the factual circumstances
intensely, pointing to “the existence of a nuclear power plant, a
greyhound racing track, a resident beach population in an area
accessible only by bridge, and a town population that doubles in the
summer months” as mitigating factors weighing in support of the

148
149
150
151
152

See Angwin v. City of Manchester, 386 A.2d 1272, 1272 (N.H. 1978).
Id.
See id. at 1273.
635 A.2d 1371 (N.H. 1993).
Id. at 1372.
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153

residency requirement.
The court also separated police officers
from other classes of employees when it acknowledged that the offduty presence of officers served an important element of the policing
154
function.
Thus, the court surmised that the totality of the police
officers’ duties distinguished their services from other employees and
warranted the unequal treatment resulting from the residency
155
requirement.
Comparing New Jersey’s approach with that of New Hampshire
demonstrates the benefits proffered by elevated constitutional
scrutiny. The Donnelly and Angwin decisions explicitly affirm that a
comprehensive residency requirement will be found to violate the
fundamental right to travel guaranteed by elevated protection under
156
the New Hampshire State Constitution. Seabrook Police Ass’n further
elucidates that a targeted residency requirement for police officers in
a town with unique factual circumstances can be upheld despite the
157
elevated scrutiny.
This suggests that allowing the judiciary to
evaluate the propriety of the legislative means and ends may
appropriately circumscribe the scope of residency requirements to
those situations where they are legitimately connected with the
employee’s employment performance, particularly when the
legislature has ignored or improperly balanced constitutional
158
concerns.
The New Jersey First Act’s attempt to institute a comprehensive
residency requirement for every public employee in the state of New
Jersey would likely be found unconstitutional under the review
provided by the New Hampshire State Constitution, as being an
overinclusive and illegitimate infringement upon the constitutional
rights of the employees. New Jersey’s approach has historically been
asymmetrical, if not completely opposed, to the New Hampshire

153

Id. at 1374.
See id.
155
Id. at 1375.
156
See Angwin v. City of Manchester, 386 A.2d 1272, 1272–73 (N.H. 1978)
(reinforcing and reapplying the heightened protections of Donnelly under the New
Hampshire State Constitution).
157
See Seabrook Police Ass’n, 635 A.2d at 1375.
158
One could, however, criticize that a court is improperly legislating by
imposing its own views instead of deferring to the legislator. This comment
fundamentally assumes that the balancing of rights approach asserted in Donnelly
would more readily safeguard personal liberty and the pursuit of happiness to a
greater extent than rational basis scrutiny.
154
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approach to continuing residency requirements.
The legislative
exemptions in New Jersey for police and firefighters create a statutory
160
Effectively,
framework that is hard to defend on a practical basis.
these exemptions create a system where secretaries, waste disposal
employees, and municipal office workers can be required to live in a
city, county, or municipality as a condition of employment, while
police and firefighters, the personnel with a presence arguably
necessary during off-duty hours or emergency situations, are exempt
from the requirement.
Moreover, comprehensive residency
requirements have routinely been upheld in New Jersey since Kennedy
and Abrahams, and the pending New Jersey First Act is not likely to be
subjected to any elevated or more stringent review. While an elevated
standard of scrutiny would likely provide the judiciary with tools
capable of circumscribing the applicable scope of residency
requirements to only those employees where residency is a sensible
extension of the employees’ duties, this remains an unlikely
161
possibility in light of New Jersey’s past jurisprudence.
In sum, arguments professing that continuing residency
requirements violate a right to travel derived from the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Federal Constitution will prove unavailing
in light of the McCarthy decision. The New Hampshire approach
offers the possibility of a more elevated scrutiny in the form of
balancing the public interest served by the requirement against the
loss of liberty suffered by the individual. This is accomplished
through provisions in New Hampshire’s State Constitution, not the
Federal Constitution’s Privileges and Immunities Clause.
Nevertheless, the initial Kennedy decision and the continued
deference to legislative balancing in New Jersey seem to assure that
any argument positing that residency requirements violate a
fundamental right to travel retained under the State Constitution will
fail.

159

Compare Angwin v. City of Manchester, 386 A.2d 1272, 1272–73 (N.H. 1978)
(heightened protections under the New Hampshire State Constitution), with
Kennedy v. City of Newark, 148 A.2d 473, 475 (N.J. 1959) (framing the issue in a way
that prevents heightened constitutional scrutiny).
160
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:14-9.1 (West 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:14-122.1
(West 2010).
161
This naturally would lead one to conclude that emergency workers and other
classes of employees that respond to emergency situations as part of their
employment function, such as firefighters and police officers, are the best candidates
for residency requirements.
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B. Equal Protection Challenge
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause
provides, in pertinent part, that “no state shall . . . deny any person
162
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
In Detroit
Police Officers Ass’n and again in McCarthy, the U.S. Supreme Court
applied rational basis review to continuing residency requirements
163
targeted towards police and firefighters. In United States v. Carolene
164
Products Co., the U.S. Supreme Court described rational basis review
165
as providing a presumption of deference to economic legislation.
As economic legislation, the New Jersey First Act would enjoy a
presumption of constitutionality against a challenge under the Equal
Protection Clause that would only be subverted if the plaintiff could
persuade the court the underlying policy reasons for the rule were
wholly irrational. The presumption of constitutionality is difficult to
surmount, and “statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any
166
state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.”
Continuing residency requirements create two classes of
persons, those within the ambit of the requirement, and all others
who, due to misfortune or personal choice, live outside the scope of
the covered geographic area.
Whereas the former have the
opportunity to obtain public employment within the applicable
jurisdiction of the residency requirement, the latter are foreclosed
from the employment opportunity unless they are able and willing to
relocate.
The statutory classification thus creates two classes,
residents and non-residents, and extends or forecloses the privilege
of having an opportunity to obtain public employment on that basis.
For example, the New Jersey First Act would render any non-resident
of New Jersey ineligible for public employment positions throughout
167
the state unless qualified for one of the narrow exemptions.
The rational basis legitimizations for residency requirements
first enumerated in Ector have effectively functioned as an acute
summation of the potential legislative policy reasons for instituting a

162

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
See Detroit Police Officers Ass’n v. City of Detroit, 190 N.W.2d 97, 103 (Mich.
1971), appeal dismissed, 405 U.S. 950 (1972); McCarthy v. Phila. Civil Serv. Comm’n,
424 U.S. 645, 645–46 (1976) (per curiam).
164
304 U.S. 144 (1938).
165
Id. at 152.
166
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961) (citation omitted).
167
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14-7(b) (West 2010).
163
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168

continuing residency requirement.
An acknowledgment of the
stringency of rational basis review and its virtual unwavering
deference to legislative decisions requires that each of these possible
legislative motivations be proven independently irrational to overturn
the legislation’s presumption of constitutionality.
Thus, each
potential legislative reason independently can serve as a sufficient
means of satisfying rational basis review, and must be examined on an
individual basis for legitimacy.
1. The Public Interest Theory
The public interest justification for continuing residency
requirements—sometimes referred to as the public coffer theory—
posits that a state may restrict the expenditure of its resources to the
169
benefit of its own members, and at the exclusion of all others.
Operating under the assumption of the public coffer theory and
viewing public employment as a privilege delegated from the state to
the general public, the theory provides that these public employment
positions can be restricted based on state membership alone because
residents of the state provide the tax monies essential to the state’s
170
functioning.
Thus, by imposing a residency requirement, a state
can better ensure that the funds it dispenses to public employees are
more likely to be redistributed back into its own economy, thereby
171
passing a tax benefit back to the state. This also appears to be the
primary legislative rationale behind the New Jersey First Act, as
evidenced by Senator Norcross’s statement: “If you want a paycheck
from New Jersey taxpayers, you should live here and pay your taxes
172
here.”
The New York statute upheld in People v. Crane is emblematic of
the use of the public interest doctrine to legitimize a legislative
preference for a state’s own citizens. The New York statute at issue in
Crane forbade employers for public works projects from employing

168

See Ector v. City of Torrance, 514 P.2d 433, 436 (Cal. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 935 (1974); Abraham v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 319 A.2d 483, 489 (N.J. 1974)
(citing the factors from Ector with approval).
169
See People v. Crane, 108 N.E. 427, 429 (N.Y. 1915), affirmed, 239 U.S. 195
(1915).
170
See id.
171
See id.
172
Senator Norcross Proposes State Residency Law, POLITICKER NJ (Mar. 9, 2010),
http://politickernj.com/droseman/37554/senator-norcross-proposes-stateresidency-law.
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173

aliens as part of their labor force. Justice Cardozo, then sitting on
the New York Court of Appeals, avowed that the court was not
defending the statute as a legislative attempt to promote efficiency
but rather to promote the welfare of the “men preferred,” and “as a
174
legitimate preference of citizens.” Reasoning that this employment
was a “privilege,” as opposed to a “right,” the New York Court of
Appeals accordingly held that the state could discriminate in favor of
175
citizens.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court approved the public coffer
theory as advanced in People v. Crane, the theory later fell into disfavor
176
and was repudiated in numerous cases, including Shapiro.
In
Shapiro, Justice Brennan rejected the argument that a state could
apportion community benefits based upon previous tax
177
contributions.
Under the guise of this logic, a state could defend
the denial of police, fire, or emergency services to a taxpayer who has
178
failed to contribute his or her fair share as determined by the state.
The U.S. Supreme Court later explained that the public interest
doctrine turned on an assumption that a state could apportion
179
“privileges,” but not “rights,” upon the basis of citizenship.
This
distinction and accompanying assumption, however, were repudiated
180
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Graham.
In Sugarman v. Dougall, city officials of New York argued that
rejection of the public interest doctrine in Graham was limited to
public assistance, and that the precedent of Crane allowed the state of
181
New York to exclude aliens from competitive civil service positions.
173

See Crane, 108 N.E. at 428.
Id. at 429–30.
175
Id. at 430. While it is true that the issue in Crane dealt with aliens, as opposed
to out of state residents, the geographical and technological limitations during 1915
when the decision came down likely diminished the likelihood of residents’
commuting regularly to serve in public employment in other states. In this sense, the
rule may have effectively limited these positions to New York state citizens.
176
See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 632 (1969).
177
Id. at 632–33.
178
See id. at 632–33.
179
See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971). The Supreme Court has
rejected a State’s ability to apportion different benefits according to classifications as
“rights” or “privileges” in various cases subsequent to People v. Crane aside from
Graham. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (citations omitted); Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
180
Graham, 403 U.S. at 374. This case partly dealt with whether a state could
impose a durational residency requirement on welfare benefits for aliens. See id. at
366.
181
See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 644 (1973).
174
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While Crane was not explicitly overruled, it was deemed noncontrolling, and the U.S. Supreme Court held that the New York
182
statute was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.
Despite the overtly protectionist undertones of the public coffer
theory, it was one of the primary justifications that the New Jersey
183
Supreme Court accepted in Kennedy.
Chief Justice Weintraub
articulated that it was within the constitutional discretion of the
legislature to utilize residency as a condition of public employment to
184
“advance the economy of the locality which yields the tax revenues.”
The New Jersey Supreme Court maintained this line of reasoning in
Abrahams even after the Supreme Court had retracted the vitality of
185
the theory.
Some advocates in favor of residency requirements posit that
removal would induce middle class public workers to leave the cities,
thereby triggering an increase in urban plight and a corresponding
186
plummet in property values.
The recent retraction of a residency
requirement in Minneapolis, however, did not create the exodus of
187
middle class public workers as opposition had anticipated.
Concerns that property values would plummet ten percent also failed
188
to materialize. Nonetheless, Minneapolis may be a unique example
and there is no assurance that these outcomes would apply to New
Jersey. Putting public policy considerations aside, the U.S. Supreme
Court’s repudiation of the public interest theory should serve to
invalidate its legitimacy as a rational basis for requiring an employee
to live within a geographic area as a condition of employment.
2. Promotion of Ethnic Balance and Curing
Unemployment
In Ector, the California Supreme Court cited the factors of
promoting ethnic balance and providing employment opportunities
189
as capable of withstanding scrutiny under the rational basis test.
182

Id. at 645–46.
See Kennedy v. City of Newark, 148 A.2d 473, 476 (N.J. 1959).
184
See id.
185
See Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 319 A.2d 483, 485 (N.J. 1974).
186
See, e.g., MPS Report, supra note 60, at 18.
187
See Jim Nichols, Minneapolis, Like Cleveland, Had Residency Rule Overturned, But
Worst Fears About Flight Didn’t Materialize, METRO-CLEVELAND.COM (June 20, 2009, 5:03
AM), http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2009/06/minneapolis_like_cleveland
_had.html.
188
See id.
189
See Ector v. City of Torrance, 514 P.2d 433, 436 (Cal. 1973).
183
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These legislative intentions appear laudable in light of the urban
flight occurring during the 1970s and the resulting racial tension in
inner-cities. In Detroit Police Officers Ass’n, a targeted residency
requirement for police officers was described as a legislative device to
“promote a feeling of trust, confidence and fraternity” between the
190
Despite the potential use of a
Detroit police and citizenry.
residency requirement to promote minority representation in public
employment or to cure the urban ill of unemployment generally,
factual circumstances may stifle continuing residency requirements
from achieving this end.
A residency requirement’s ineffectiveness in promoting the
legislative end of ethnic balance was observed in a more recent case
where the NAACP successfully challenged the New Jersey township of
191
Harrison’s residency requirement under Title VII in federal court.
The town of Harrison had always adhered to a strict policy of limiting
the hiring pool of public employees for uniformed and non192
uniformed positions to applicants from the town. At the time when
the case was brought in 1991, only Harrison residents had ever been
193
considered for uniformed positions.
This led to the avowed
unintended consequence of an African American never holding a
194
position within the town.
Harrison sought to defend the
requirement and relied heavily on Abrahams, but the reasons were
rejected as “too nebulous and insubstantial” to justify the disparate
195
impact under the more demanding Title VII standard.
While Newark Branch, NAACP v. Harrison is a special case
involving a challenge under Title VII, the circumstances establish that
presuming that the promotion of ethnic balance is a policy
justification served by residency requirements is capricious because
196
residency does not ensure a certain racial or ethnic composition.
190

Detroit Police Officers Ass’n v. City of Detroit, 190 N.W.2d 97, 98 (Mich. 1971)
(Brennan, J., concurring), appeal dismissed, 405 U.S. 950 (1972).
191
Newark Branch, NAACP v. Harrison, 940 F.2d 792, 804 (3d Cir. 1991). Since
the challenge was brought under Title VII, the ordinance was subjected to a standard
above and beyond rational basis that required the town of Harrison to produce
evidence that the residency requirement furthered a legitimate business goal in a
significant manner. Id. at 803.
192
Id. at 795.
193
Id. at 796.
194
Id.
195
Id. at 801–02, 805.
196
Harrison was not the only town in northern New Jersey with residency
requirements that the NAACP targeted for their racially discriminatory effects. See
generally Fort Lee Drops Hiring Rule to Settle N.A.A.C.P. Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1992, at
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Whereas Harrison faithfully enforced its requirement, the
homogenous racial composition of the town rendered the residency
requirement an impediment to achieving racial balance in public
197
employment.
In short, more direct hiring practices would better
provide a means of promoting ethnic balance in jurisdictions where
198
this is a proper legislative end.
In regard to unemployment, continuing residency requirements
can serve as a legislative solution to decrease local unemployment
199
figures.
After the most recent fiscal crisis in 2008, some public
administrators in towns throughout northern New Jersey began
reconsidering the use of residency requirements that were on the
200
books but apparently unenforced until recent times. In Hoboken,
thirty city employees residing outside of the town were told to move
back to the town or be fired as a response to the town facing a huge
201
tax increase.
In Jersey City, the current status of the requirement
suffers from massive non-compliance, with the municipal clerk
estimating that 1,237 of the city’s 2,940 public employees live outside
202
of its limits.
If Jersey City, or any other place similarly situated, undertook a

7 (noting that Fort Lee, Clifton, Harrison, Kearny, West Orange, Bayonne, and
Millburn all faced challenges to their residency requirements from the NAACP and
that the town of Fort Lee had dropped its rule as a response); Terry Pristin, Judge
Allows Residency Rule, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1996, at 1 (highlighting that the challenge
against the Bayonne residency requirement was unsuccessful).
197
Newark Branch, NAACP, 904 F.2d at 795. At the time the case was decided,
ninety-eight percent of the town of Harrison was white. See Court Fight Doesn’t Save
Residency Requirement, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1998, at 6.
198
See Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 319 A.2d 483, 497 (1974) (Pashman, J.,
dissenting) (describing the issue pertaining to who the city hires and not the issue of
residency requirements).
199
See S. S1730, 214th Conditional Veto (N.J. 2011).
200
See
Ricardo
Kaulessar,
Residency
Requirements
Cause
Controversy,
HUDSONREPORTER.COM (Jan. 6, 2009), http://www.hudsonreporter.com/view/full
_story/1211333/article-Residency-requirements-cause-controversy-Bayonne—othertowns-will-force-city-workers-to-live-here-.
201
Id. Bayonne’s town administrator apparently circulated an internal memo
reminding all non-uniformed employees that they needed to comply with the
residency requirement or face termination, and in West New York the town’s mayor
is considering instituting a comprehensive residency requirement that would
requirement all newly hired employees to reside in the town. Id.
202
Id. Recall that there is a statutory exemption for police and firefighters in
New Jersey that would apply to a number of the non-complying Jersey City public
employees. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:14-9.1 (West 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:14122.1 (West 2010). Thus, theoretically a sizeable portion of those employees have
statutory exemptions.
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more strenuous enforcement of its residency requirement, the result
would almost necessarily entail a reduction in unemployment. As
employees are confronted with the difficult choice of abandoning
their positions or changing their homes, a certain number of
employees will refuse to relocate and thus be terminated for non203
Since the effect of a residency
compliance with the requirement.
requirement is to restrict the flow of labor from outside sources by
limiting employment opportunities to a jurisdiction’s residents, some
of a town’s otherwise unemployed residents will receive a competitive,
if not exclusive, advantage to obtain these employment positions.
The detriment shifts to any and all otherwise eligible persons who are
stifled from obtaining employment by the requirement.
The original bill proposed by Senator Norcross would have
required all current employees of New Jersey to become residents of
204
the state within two and a half years of enactment. This would have
required eight percent (approximately 6,075) of the state’s
205
employees to either move to New Jersey or forfeit their jobs.
Municipal and county workers throughout New Jersey residing
outside of the state would have found themselves in the same forced
206
situation.
Fortunately for current employees, the New Jersey First
Act, as approved, contains a grandfather clause for all current
employees so long as they have no break in public service greater
207
than seven days.
Without the grandfather clause, the New Jersey
First Act would have remedied unemployment by securing a certain
number of positions that were previously held by New Jersey’s
neighbors from Delaware, Pennsylvania, and New York, but were lost
because the affected workers were either unable or unwilling to
relocate to New Jersey. As the bill currently stands, it will help to
remedy future unemployment by permanently foreclosing public
employment positions to all residents living outside of New Jersey
208
unwilling to relocate there.
The massive bridges spanning the
natural boundaries created by the Hudson and Delaware Rivers
203

See Werner Z. Hirsch & Anthony M. Rufolo, Economic Effects of Residence Laws on
Municipal Police, 17 J. URB. ECON. 335, 338 (1985).
204
See S. S1730, 214th Leg. (N.J. 2010).
205
Jersey May Grandfather PA Residents, THE MORNING CALL (Mar. 31, 2010),
http://articles.mcall.com/2010-03-31/news/all-newjerseyresidency03312010_1_residency-bill-new-jersey-senate-williams-townships.
206
See id.
207
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14-7 (West 2010).
208
Id. The one major exception will be for persons at institutions of higher
education and those exempted by the five-member committee. Id.
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between New Jersey and its neighboring states signify a testament to
our states’ connectedness that ought to be reflected in our policies
towards one another in both the public and private sector. As State
Representative Steve Santarsiero of the thirty-first legislative district of
Pennsylvania lamented, “We shouldn’t be passing laws that set up
barriers between states, either in the private or the public sector. . . .
There are people out there working hard . . . and it shouldn’t matter
209
where they live.” As commonsense as Santarsiero’s statement is, it
does little to change the benefit of insulating our own tax base and
public employment positions by restricting the flow of outside labor.
3. Community Identity and Stake in the City
An amalgamation of the Ector factors suggests that residency
requirements forge a beneficial community identity between public
employees and the community-at-large, thereby causing these
employees to work harder by way of their knowledge and
210
In addition, this sense of
commitment to the community.
community interest also purportedly results in a reduction of
211
tardiness and absenteeism.
An individual’s subjective feeling of a
greater affinity to a community is difficult to measure, if calculable at
all. A recent qualitative study on the effect of residency requirements
in providing community interest benefits revealed that officers
disagreed that such benefits were obtained by imposition of residency
212
requirements.
Whatever particular community benefits would accrue from a
residency requirement, more objective measurements would provide
insight into what is actually happening and affecting employees than
mere speculation. Absenteeism and tardiness could be remedied
through attendance policies that accrue benefits for complying
employees and punish those failing to meet the requisites.
Employees could be tested on any knowledge of the city that is
213
relevant to the performance of duties. The possibility of addressing
209

Santarsiero Pens Letter to N.J. Legislators Opposing Residency Requirements for State
Employees, PENNSYLVANIA HOUSE DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS (Mar. 12, 2010),
http://www.pahouse.com/pr/031031210.asp.
210
Ector v. City of Torrance, 514 P.2d 433, 436 (Cal. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
935 (1974).
211
Id.
212
See Johnson, Warchol & Bumphus, supra note 61, at 55. These officers’
responses are likely biased to the extent they would prefer not to be subject to the
requirements.
213
For example, if a fire department thinks that use of a residency requirement is
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objectives of the community through means capable of objective
measurement suggest that depriving the individual of his choice of
where to live while retaining a position of employment on the basis of
a community of interest theory may be an excess burden on liberty.
Nevertheless, under a rational basis level of scrutiny, this elusive and
ephemeral reason will continue to be accepted as it is difficult to
either repudiate or substantiate.
4. Adequate Response to Emergency Situations
The most consistent reason proffered in Ector and other cases for
enacting continuing residency requirements has been to ensure an
adequate and prompt response time during emergency situations
214
unique to a particular class of employees.
In Detroit Police Officers
Ass’n, the Michigan Supreme Court highlighted the distinguishing
characteristics of a police officer’s duties and considered these
differences to be dispositive in creating a rationally distinguishable
class that could be subjected to discriminatory treatment by the
215
legislature. In McCarthy, the U.S. Supreme Court also resolved the
constitutionality of a targeted residency requirement for firefighters
in favor of the city of Philadelphia after a challenge by an employee
216
who relocated to New Jersey. Prior to the McCarthy decision, earlier
court decisions from various jurisdictions had also concluded that
police were distinguished from other classes of public employees
upon rejecting the application of comprehensive residency
217
requirements to public school teachers.
Although perhaps the most defensible basis for imposing
residency requirements, the need to preserve a presence in a city or
geographical area should only apply to those classes of employees
with incumbent duties that require their presence during off-duty
important to ensure that all firefighters know the quickest ways around the town to
ensure prompt response time while on duty, a test could easily be devised to ensure
that the employee is aware of what route to take in a given emergency situation.
Moreover, it could be problematic to presume that residency necessitates certain
knowledge about the city that is pertinent to the position. The person might lack the
expected and required knowledge irrespective of living within the purview of the
requirement.
214
See Ector, 514 P.2d at 436; see also Detroit Police Officers Ass’n v. City of Detroit,
190 N.W.2d 97, 97–98 (1971), appeal dismissed, 405 U.S. 950 (1972).
215
See Detroit Police Officers Ass’n v. City of Detroit, 190 N.W.2d 97, 97–98
(Mich. 1971).
216
McCarthy v. Phila. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 424 U.S. 645, 645 (1976) (per curiam).
217
See Hanson v. Unified Sch. Dist., 364 F. Supp. 330, 334 (D. Kan. 1974);
Donnelly v. City of Manchester, 274 A.2d 789, 790–91 (N.H. 1971).
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hours.
This rationale is particularly applicable to emergency
response employees. In any event, the New Jersey First Act does not
adopt this legislative reasoning since the scope of the requirement
effectively bars those living outside of the state from obtaining any
218
public employment position within the state.
In effect, the law
would allow a firefighter in Cape May to live in Bergen County,
despite disallowing a Hunterdon County firefighter the option of
living in New Hope, Pennsylvania—a town directly across the
Delaware River adjacent to Hunterdon County. This seems to suggest
that the emergency response time rationale is only applicable to a
geographically smaller residency requirement circumscribed to a
county, city, or municipality.
The theoretical underpinnings of the application of the
rationale have fewer implications for New Jersey firefighters and
police as these employees already enjoy a statutory exemption from
219
residency requirements that was obtained during the 1970s. As
firefighters and police are the archetypal emergency positions held
by the publicly employed, the legislative purpose of enacting this
statewide exemption from localized residency requirements is
questionable. As a practical matter, it is arbitrary reasoning to
require a publicly employed secretary to live in a town, when police
and firefighters are exempted from the requirement despite having
emergency employment duties that necessitate proximate residency
to a geographic location. In Trenton, where eighty percent of the
“rank-and-file” firefighters live outside the city, the department has
had to rely more on volunteer support because some employees,
220
living over forty-five minutes away, cannot respond in time.
This
calls into question the ends that residency requirements in New
221
Jersey seek to promote and whether this utilization is problematic.
While the emergency response justification seems strongest in
light of the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in McCarthy
and Detroit Police Officers Ass’n dealt with targeted residency
requirements for police and firefighters, New Jersey’s legislative
exemptions have reduced the reasonableness of this justification for

218

See S. S1730, 214th Leg. (N.J. 2010).
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:14-9.1 (West 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:14-122.1
(West 2010).
220
Jay Romano, Challenging Residency as Job Requirement, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1991,
at 1. In Camden, New Jersey, approximately ninety percent of the rank and file
firefighters live outside of the city. Id.
221
See infra Part III.C.
219
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enforcing residency requirements.
Aside from the potential
detriment to public safety that may occur when police and
firefighters do not observe residency requirements, there also seems
to be a fundamental unfairness to selectively exempt these classes of
employees while imposing the requirement on other employees
where justifications are more tenuous. Multiple jurisdictions and the
U.S. Supreme Court have specifically identified police and firefighter
as classes of employees with emergent employment duties that
distinguish their position from other public workers.
The
commonsense of this logic is indubitable, and it ought to be reflected
in the legislature’s balancing.
5. Rational Basis Scrutiny of Residency Requirements
Although many of the legislative reasons underpinning the use
of residency requirements can be called into question directly, the
New Jersey judiciary has remained conscious of the legislative
balancing and reticent to weigh in on any policy judgments regarding
222
residency requirements. Other jurisdictions have directly addressed
residency requirements beyond their surface policy justifications,
thereby mitigating some of the judicial deference under rational basis
scrutiny historically accorded by the New Jersey Supreme Court.
In a case predating McCarthy, a teacher in Kansas challenged the
applicability of a comprehensive residency requirement incumbent
on all public employees of Wyandotte County to live within its
223
geographic jurisdiction. Although the Court applied a compelling
interest standard, it posited that the classification was “essentially
arbitrary” and would have been invalidated even if subjected to a
224
rational basis review.
In Lewis v. City of Kinston, a police officer,
upon being informed that he needed to move within the county or
face termination, challenged the enforceability of a city ordinance
requiring all city employees to reside in Lenoir County under the
225
Equal Protection Clause. The North Carolina court acknowledged
that Ector supplied the applicable rational basis level of scrutiny to
review the ordinance, and summarized that the city’s reasons for the
requirement were to ensure that the individual would: (1) contribute
to the city’s tax base; (2) vote in city elections; (3) participate in the
222

See Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 319 A.2d 483, 485 (N.J. 1974); Kennedy v.
City of Newark, 148 A.2d 473, 475 (N.J. 1959).
223
See Hanson v. Unified Sch. Dist., 364 F. Supp. 330, 330–31 (D. Kan. 1974).
224
Id. at 334.
225
Lewis v. City of Kinston, 488 S.E.2d 274, 275 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997).
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city’s community; and (4) respond quickly in the event of an
226
emergency situation. Although the court accepted that these were
rational ends, it still found the ordinance unconstitutional under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and also under
227
the North Carolina State Constitution.
Since the ordinance
provided the plaintiff with an option of living not only within the city
of Kinston but also in the surrounding Lenoir County, the court
reasoned that there was no reasonable assurance that the residency
requirement would further the aforementioned goals of the
228
residency requirement.
The court also rejected the emergency
response time exception because the location of the city of Kinston
and the shape of Lenoir County rendered parts of the county farther
229
from the city of Kinston than other neighboring counties.
In the
eyes of the court, this constituted an arbitrary and irrational
230
connection between the legislative means and proclaimed objective.
The Lewis case serves as evidence that plaintiffs could potentially
utilize the rational basis test to invalidate a residency requirement if
there is not a sufficient nexus between the legislative objective and
the use of a residency requirement to obtain that objective. The case
is exceptional in that the court scrupulously examined the relations
between the legislative ends and means, and it is questionable
whether such a review would occur in New Jersey in light of the past
jurisprudence of Abrahams and Kennedy.
Nevertheless, Lewis
illustrates that a challenge under a rational basis standard of review
could be successful under certain circumstances.
In sum, challenges to continuing residency requirements under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution are likely to
falter in most circumstances. While the more recent Lewis case from
North Carolina establishes the possibility of rational basis scrutiny
invalidating a comprehensive residency requirement, the scrupulous

226

Id. at 276.
See N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19 (“No person shall be taken, imprisoned, or
disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any
manner deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land. No
person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws; nor shall any person be
subjected to discrimination by the State because of race, color, religion, or national
origin.”); Lewis, 488 S.E.2d at 277.
228
Lewis, 488 S.E.2d at 277.
229
Id. Specifically, the requirement would not ensure plaintiff would vote in
municipal elections, contribute to the city’s tax base, or obtain an interest in the
community. Id.
230
Id.
227
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review by which the Lewis court applied rational basis scrutiny was
231
New Jersey, in particular, has exercised a continued
atypical.
deference towards implementation of continuing residency
requirements since the earliest Equal Protection challenges were
232
levied under the Federal or New Jersey Constitution.
Thus, any
challenges to the New Jersey First Act employing an equal protection
argument, whether under the State or Federal Constitution, will have
an improbable chance at success in light of past New Jersey
jurisprudence regarding residency requirements.
C. Dormant Commerce Clause
Article I of the Federal Constitution empowers Congress “to
233
regulate commerce . . . amongst the several states.”
Although not
explicitly stated, the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted a negative
power into the Commerce Clause empowering the judiciary to
234
invalidate laws that disproportionately burden interstate commerce.
When applied to a state law in putative violation of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, a court must first determine whether the
ordinance or statute at issue discriminates against interstate
235
commerce.
Upon finding that the ordinance or statute at issue
burdens interstate commerce, a court must then proceed to
determine whether the burden is “clearly excessive” when weighed
236
against the “putative local benefits.”
Thus, the first step for
establishing a cognizable Dormant Commerce Clause claim requires
showing that the public employment positions foreclosed to nonresidents by a given residency requirement are subjects of interstate
commerce burdened by the restriction on the flow of labor.
The public employment relationship is similar to the
employment relationship in the private sector in the sense that the
employee proffers his time and energy in return for some form of
compensation. At some basic level, the employee contracts to sell his
labor to an employer, who is coincidentally the government in the
context of public employment. In New Jersey, the government’s total

231

See discussion supra Part III.B.
See discussion supra Part III.B.
233
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
234
See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 579
(1997) (invalidating a tax scheme that disproportionately disadvantaged out-ofstaters in favor of the interests of local residents).
235
C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994).
236
Id.
232
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salary expenditure for public employees throughout the entire state
for the month of March 2009 approximated $2.6 billion, a substantial
237
expenditure of revenue. The sheer magnitude of New Jersey’s total
state expenditure on public employment alone, nearly $30 billion
238
annually, affects interstate commerce.
The restriction on the flow
of labor accomplished by any statewide residency requirement
arguably puts a burden on interstate commerce by preventing an
otherwise capable labor force from a neighboring state from entering
the labor market. It is specifically this flow of labor between states
that the New Jersey First Act targets. The negative economic impact
on the neighboring state would perhaps constitute a burden on
interstate commerce sufficient to implicate a Dormant Commerce
Clause analysis.
Proceeding under the assumption that the public employment
positions foreclosed by the New Jersey First Act constitute
“commerce” under the Commerce Clause, a plaintiff challenging a
statute carries the initial burden of showing discrimination against
239
the commerce of another state. Statutes that are discriminatory on
their face against the economic interests of out-of-state residents have
been deemed invalid unless there was no alternative means to
240
advance the local interest.
Where a state regulates even-handedly
and only incidentally favors local economic interests, the statute will
be “upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
241
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” In Pike v. Bruce
Church, the U.S. Supreme Court further provided that a balancing
approach considering the burden on interstate commerce weighed
against the putative local benefit, while taking into consideration
other plausible means of achieving the legislative end, should be the
242
approach taken to resolve the tension.
With regard to the New Jersey First Act, the legislative ends
sought debatably stem from protectionist economic motivations. The
237

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2009 Annual Survey of Public Employment and Payroll
of New Jersey, http://www2.census.gov/govs/apes/09stlnj.txt (last updated Jan. 2012).
238
See id.
239
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
240
See City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628 (1978). An ordinance that
discriminates against out-of-state residents exclusively as a local economic
protectionist measure will be not be sustained despite discriminating against some instate and out-of-state residents. See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349,
356 (1951).
241
Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
242
Id.
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bill’s sponsor, Senator Norcross, advanced the bill as a piece of longoverdue legislation capable of providing a significant source of
243
revenue during the tough economic times witnessed since 2008. Its
protectionist nature sparked concern from Pennsylvania State
Representative Steve Santarsiero, who urged for the incorporation of
the grandfather clause that was eventually added to the Senate
244
Committee substitute and subsequently adopted in the final bill.
Other Pennsylvania legislators also threatened to introduce an
identical residency bill as a response to the New Jersey First Act when
245
it was still pending legislation. These threats of retaliatory measures
embody a fear of feuding between and among the states leading to
the creation of protectionist laws. As the U.S. Supreme Court
asserted in Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig Inc., “The Constitution was framed
under the dominion of a political philosophy less parochial in range.
It was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states
must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and
246
salvation are in union and not division.”
In some respects, a challenge to a continuing residency
requirement under the Dormant Commerce Clause is stronger if the
requirement is statewide as opposed to a more localized residency
requirement limited to a county or city. For example, the New Jersey
First Act, as enacted, forecloses all future opportunities to obtain
public employment positions to persons residing outside of New
247
Jersey.
Whereas a localized residency requirement only affects a
smaller pool of outside residents, the larger the scope of the
requirement, the greater the restriction on the flow of labor and
resulting burden on interstate commerce. In this sense, the New
Jersey First Act and similar residency requirements embody a form of
economic protectionism more likely to be invalidated by judicial
review under the functioning of the Dormant Commerce Clause than
those circumscribed to smaller geographical localities.
A Dormant Commerce Clause challenge to the New Jersey First
243

See Senator Norcross Proposes State Residency Law, supra note 172.
Jersey May Grandfather PA Residents, supra note 205.
245
Id. Pennsylvanian State Senator Lisa Boscola did propose an identical bill but
only as part of a protest to the requirements and not as part of a serious agenda to
institute the requirement. See Lisa Boscola Introduces Pa. Residency Bill to Get N.J
June
24,
2010,
Legislators’
Attention,
EXPRESS-TIMES,
http://www.lehighvalleylive.com/today/index.ssf/2010/06/lisa_boscola_introduces
_pa_res.html.
246
294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
247
See S. S1730, 214th Leg. (N.J. 2010).
244
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Act or a similar comprehensive residency requirement could
potentially provide a more favorable standard of review than could be
obtained under rational basis scrutiny. Specifically, when using this
review, a court would balance the legislative rationales for residency
requirements, as summarized in Ector, against the burden on
interstate commerce. This would invite a greater level of scrutiny
than that offered by rational basis review, especially in light of the
tremendous deference it accords to continuing residency
requirements. A Dormant Commerce Clause analysis would bring
any statewide comprehensive residency requirement, such as the New
Jersey First Act, into proper economic focus. Thus, a challenge
under the Dormant Commerce Clause, if accepted, could provide an
elevated level of constitutional scrutiny as compared to the standards
afforded under Equal Protection and Privileges and Immunities
challenges.
IV. CONCLUSION
In New Jersey, the judiciary has long regarded residency
requirements as a constitutional exercise of legislative power
248
rationally related to promoting an acceptable end. The New Jersey
First Act, despite its benefits to New Jersey residents, would fashion a
protectionist measure against our neighboring states. The exclusion
of our neighbors from public employment opportunities could also
provoke retaliatory legislation that would be to the detriment of many
249
New Jersey residents.
The cost of imposing a residency requirement comes in the form
of a loss of liberty that falls primarily on the individuals forced to quit
their positions or relocate. Even with the use of a grandfather clause,
such as was incorporated in the final version of the New Jersey First
Act, the loss of liberty still affects all future out-of-state residents as
their ability to find public employment positions is inevitably
constrained to a more limited market. Residency requirements may
also have the effect of filtering applicants from positions solely based
on their place of domicile, threatening to create local political
oligarchies. In short, a merit-based system aimed at creating the most
capable public workforce ought to be the objective of hiring practices
248

See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
See Lisa Boscola Introduces Pa. Residency Bill to Get N.J Legislators’ Attention, supra
note 245. A bill like the one proposed by Senator Lisa Biscola of Pennsylvania is
inherently more problematic and would injure any New Jersey resident seeking
public employment in Pennsylvania. See id.
249
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for any municipality or government. Although these ends may be
sought tangentially through the use of residency requirements, the
causal nexus between these ends and means is lacking.
Limited legal remedies remain available for challenging
residency requirements. The McCarthy case has virtually foreclosed
the possibility of the success of any fundamental right to travel
challenges to residency requirements under the Federal Privileges
and Immunities Clause. This remains especially pronounced in light
of the fact that the New Jersey Supreme Court is unlikely to overrule
its earlier decision in Kennedy or follow the precedent of Donnelly.
Given the substantial deference the New Jersey Supreme Court
enunciated in Kennedy, it is also unlikely that arguments under the
New Jersey State Constitution calling for a fundamental right of
travel, applicable to continuing residency requirements, would
succeed. While this avenue of challenging the New Jersey First Act is
plausible under the State Constitution, its chances of success are
improbable.
Detroit Police Officers Ass’n further established that rational basis
scrutiny would be the constitutional standard of review for challenges
to continuing residency requirements under the Equal Protection
Clause. Challenges under the Fourteenth Amendment have a
plausible chance of succeeding on certain factual circumstances, but
this cannot be assured given the tremendous presumption of
deference accorded to the legislature.
Finally, a plausible argument could be made that continuing
residency requirements violate the Federal Constitution under a
Dormant Commerce Clause analysis. This argument has never been
directly levied at a comprehensive residency requirement and the
feasibility of the claim remains questionable. In particular, it hinges
on an assumption that statewide employment restrictions affect and
burden interstate commerce. Assuming the burden exists, this
argument offers the potential of a balancing approach that would
perhaps be more favorable than the rational basis scrutiny proffered
under the Equal Protection Clause.
Even in the absence of judicial relief, a question remains as to
whether the New Jersey First Act is the proper political solution.
While the New Jersey legislature has contrived of a manner to
exclude out-of-state residents from a large sector of New Jersey’s labor
market, other states have completely eradicated the residency
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250

requirement by way of state statute. If the motive of the New Jersey
First Act and other residency requirements is merely to insulate the
local tax base or bolster employment through geographic favoritism,
we ought to abhor these measures and seek alternatives that do not
impinge on the free movement of labor and liberty interests of the
individual. The irony rendering this conclusion mostly unlikely,
however, can be grasped by common sense. Simply put, restricting
public employment positions to a single state’s residents has the dual
advantage of increasing the number of local jobs, a concern of
constituents, and increasing tax collection, a prime concern of
legislatures. The constituency populations most affected by these
laws, moreover, reside in neighboring states and cannot help
themselves by voting out the politicians that have deprived them of
public employment. With a dual benefit to be obtained and no
cognizable detriment to the political popularity of the enacting
legislators, it is of little surprise that the New Jersey First Act was
passed.
As time passes and more New Jersey residents inure benefits
from the New Jersey First Act by obtaining public employment
positions to the exclusion of otherwise eligible out-of-state residents,
one can portend that a political inertia favoring the Act will develop.
This inertia will render it dubious that the individual liberty lost,
whether considered constitutionally protected or not, will ever be
restored.

250

See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-2-15.1 (exempting police officers and firefighters);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-2-15.2 (exempting municipal employees); see also R.I. GEN. LAWS §
16-12-9 (exempting public school teachers and administrators); City of Lima v. State,
909 N.E.2d 616, 621 (Ohio 2009) (upholding legislative ban on all residency
requirements throughout the state of Ohio).

